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Case No. 20090105-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATEOFUTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
TEVITA F. TAFUNA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether this Court should review Defendant's claim that the trial court 
erred in failing to excuse a juror who communicated with a prosecution witness 
where Defendant invited any error? 
Standard of Review. "[Reviewing court] decline[s] to address [a claim of error] 
because the '[defendant] invited the very error complained of on appeal.'" State v. 
Kiriluk, 1999 UT App 30, f 23,975 P.2d 469 (quoting State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 
700 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996). Assuming review on the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
merits, the trial court's decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Logan City v. 
Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224,225 (Utah App. 1990) (reviewing denial of new trial motion, 
based on alleged improper seating of juror who had improper contact with bailiff, 
for abuse of discretion) (citation omitted). 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied a motion for 
mistrial after a state witness briefly mentioned previously excluded information? 
Standard of Review. A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's denial of 
a motion for mistrial absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Butterfield, 2001UT 59, f^ 
46,27P.3dll33. 
STATUTE 
The following statute is attached at Addendum A. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery (Count I), a first degree 
felony, and purchase, transfer, possession or use of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person (Count II), a class A misdemeanor. R6-7. The case was tried to a 
jury over three days. R185-94. Before the State presented its first witness, a juror 
disclosed to the trial court that he had mistakenly spoken with a witness. R289:3-4. 
After speaking with the juror and with the agreement of the prosecutor and defense 
counsel, the court allowed the juror to remain on the panel. Id. at 5-6. 
2 
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At the end of the second day of trial, Defendant moved to dismiss Count II. 
R189. The State agreed, and the trial court granted the motion. Id.; R294:326. 
Just before the jury left the courtroom to deliberate, Defendant suggested that, 
in an excess of caution, the juror might be replaced with an alternate. R290:51,55. 
The trial court refused, based on the parties' approval of the juror, the untimeliness 
of the motion, and the apparent lack of juror taint. Id. at 55-56. The jury convicted 
Defendant of aggravated robbery. R203. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 
The a statutory five-years-to-life term in the Utah State Prison. R261-62. Defendant 
timely appealed. R266. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court. 
R283. 
Upon Defendant's motion and without opposition from the State, this Court 
temporarily remanded the case back to the trial court to clarify whether the 
deliberating jurors included the juror who had communicated with a prosecution 
witness. R311. Following remand, the trial court identified the juror and confirmed 
that the juror had deliberated and served as jury foreperson. R314-19. 
Thereafter, Defendant moved for a remand under Utah R. App. P. 23B to 
determine whether his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to develop facts that 
would show he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to juror at issue. 
This Court denied the motion, ruling that the record was adequate to determine the 
matter on appeal. 
3 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Offense 
Defendant went to a Halloween party on October 27,2007, where he and his 
friend, PJ Valdez, stole numerous items from the party's hosts, and Defendant 
threatened other partiers with a knife when they tried to prevent his escape. R293:4-
5,13,18,19,63-64. 
Jesse Surfass was at the party, hosted at the Sandy home of Mark McMillen 
and Jesse's friends, Grant and Joel Wolmuth, brothers. Id. at 4-5,32,44. Having just 
moved into this home, Grant was showing his friend, Mark Buyer, around the house 
and led Mark to his main floor bedroom. Id. at 9,48. The door to the bedroom was 
closed and Defendant stood in front of it with his arms folded across his chest. Id. at 
10, 31. Grant said to Defendant, "Well, let me get into my room." Id. at 9. 
Defendant answered, "No, you can't go in there." Id. R293:14. Grant reached 
around Defendant and opened the door; at the same time, Defendant backed into 
the bedroom, pulled a knife from his pocket, flipped it open and, holding it at Grant 
from about four feet away, threatened him to "[bjack the fuck off." Id. at 14-15,59-
60. Both Jesse and Grant saw Valdez counting out change from Grant's change jar. 
Id. at 13,58-59. Grant, now standing in the doorway, threw up his hands and asked 
Defendant to drop his "stuff" and leave. Id. at 14-16. Instead, Defendant, still 
brandishing the knife, grabbed a small black laptop computer bag from the 
bedroom. Id. at 16-18,36-37. Defendant continued to "aggressively]" brandish the 
4 
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knife to hold off the other guests who had gathered as he and Valdez left the room 
and made their way down the stairs to exit the house. Id. at 16-25. 
Five other guests — Mark Buyer, Angela Gallo, Jessica Parry, Cody Fehr, and 
Shawn Biel—in addition to others, collectively testified to the same events: Grant 
looked "kind of startled" in finding two men in his bedroom, and asked them what 
they were doing there and whether they were stealing anything (R294:ll-12,63,77); 
Defendant pulled out a knife and threatened, "[y]ou don't want none of this,"as 
Grant stepped into his bedroom (id. at 13; R294:29-30); one of the intruders "had a 
pocket full of change" (R293:12); Defendant pressed the knife blade to the face of a 
party guest who tried to stop him as he made his way out of the house (R293:79; 
294:66,79); and the bedroom was in disarray after Defendant and Valdez ransacked 
it. R294:189. Defendant carried a CD or DVD player as he made his way out of the 
house. Id. at 266-67. 
Defendant and Valdez ran down the stairs, brandishing knives at the party 
guests as they made their way out of the house. R294:103-05. Grant went back to 
his "ransacked" bedroom, and, grabbing some knives to defend his guests, gave one 
of them to Cody and pursued Defendant and Valdez out to the front yard. R293:62-
63, 85-87, 90; 294:32. There, Grant overtook Valdez and held a knife to his throat 
and demanded that Valdez "drop [his] stuff." R293:87,94. Defendant broke off his 
retreat, turned, and came at Grant, brandishing his knife. R293:95; 294:34. Other 
5 
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guests tackled Defendant and kicked and punched him, but he and Valdez broke 
away and fled in their car. R293:96; R294:33, 37, 68-69, 82-83,111-12,130,146-47, 
214-16,220-22. Valdez carried a black bag into the the car. R294:247-49. In the fight 
and in their flight, Valdez wounded Joel Wolmuth, TC Valdez, Shawn Biels, and 
Marty Newbury with a knife, and Defendant was stabbed in one of his eyes. 
R294:37,48-49, 70, 86, 93, 111, 129,149. 
During the fight, one of the guests called the police, who arrived about five 
minutes later. R294:269-70. 
Grant reported that numerous items were taken from his room: a laptop, 
three iPods, an iPod radio player, a watch, a cell phone, University of Utah season 
tickets, a camera, a pager, a few remote controls, paperwork, and a DVD player. 
R293:63-64. He recovered most of these items after Cody retrieved the black laptop 
computer bag later that evening. R293:64-67; 294:35-36. Additional stolen property 
was delivered to the police. R293:89; R294151-53. 
During his direct examination, the investigating detective testified that he 
received a "leather coat with several people - - several people type IDs in one of its 
pockets/' testimony the parties had stipulated would not be mentioned. R294:174, 
285-86, 292. Defendant moved for a mistrial. Id. at 295-97. The court denied the 
motion because the reference was brief and neither party dwelt on it. M a t 297. 
6 
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The Defense 
Defendant testified that he did not act as a lookout or help Valdez steal 
anything from Grant's bedroom and that he was in the kitchen when the "ruckus" 
began. R295:18-20,27-28. Rather, seeing Valdez in an argument, he pushed his way 
through the crowd, stood in front of the door, and asked permission to get Valdez 
and leave. Id. at 23. But one guest would not allow him to leave and brandished a 
knife at him. Id. at 24. Fearing for his life, Defendant grabbed a knife from 
somewhere in Grant's bedroom. Id. at 25. Then, without threatening anyone, and 
using the knife only defensively, he ran down the stairs to get out of the house. Id. 
at26,53-54. 
Defendant ran from the house toward the car in which he had come to the 
party. Id. at 27-30. As he opened the door to the car, someone grabbed him from 
behind and he was hit in the eye. Id. at 30-32. After repeated efforts to break from 
the crowd surrounding him, Defendant was tackled, stabbed in the shoulder, then 
punched and kicked. Id. at 32-36. Finally, someone helped him to the car. Id. at 36. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to excuse a witness who 
communicated with one of the State's witnesses. In his discussion, however, 
Defendant fails to mention that he invited any error when he emphatically endorsed 
7 
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the witness, observing that he believed "nothing inappropriate happened/' the juror 
took his "honest mistake" very seriously, and that the juror would act 
conscientiously as a juror. The trial court relied on Defendant's observations and 
allowed the juror to remain on the jury. Although Defendant later suggested that 
the court replace the questioned juror just as the jury retired to deliberate, he failed 
to preserve his claim because he offered no further evidence that the juror was 
tainted. Because Defendant invited any error in the juror's being seated and later 
failed to effectively preserve his claim, the Court should decline to review it. 
But even considering the claim, Defendant has failed to show that the juror-
witness contact was sufficient to raise a presumption of prejudice. The contact was 
incidental, unintended, and brief. The juror explained that he accidentally turned 
down the wrong hallway in the courthouse and so encountered witnesses rather 
than jurors. A witness made a comment about how long he had been waiting, 
which initiated a two-minute conversation about airport carpeting. When both 
parties realized their mistake in talking to each other, they immediately ended their 
conversation. Defendant's cited authority does not support this juror-witness 
contact was sufficient to raise a presumption of prejudice. And even if the 
conversation did favorably incline the juror toward the witness, the juror could not 
reasonably have reached a different decision where the State called numerous 
8 
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witnesses who consistently and redundantly testified as to each and every element 
required to prove Defendant's guilt. 
'.'• II. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his mistrial motion 
based on a detective's reference, in contravention of the parties' stipulation, that IDs 
belonging to other people were found in the pocket of a jacket likely belonging to 
Defendant. The trial court, however, did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion. The court correctly recognized that the reference was very brief, the 
prosecutor immediately moved on, and defense counsel saved his objection until 
out of the hearing of the jury. Further, the reference was somewhat vague in that it 
did not necessarily mean that Defendant was involved in criminal activity. 
Additionally, the trial court struck the evidence and gave a curative instruction, 
directing the jury to disregard the detective's brief reference. Finally, any prejudice 
stemming from the reference was nullified by strong evidence of guilt from multiple 
witneses. 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
I - • . 
DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR WHEN HE AGREED THAT 
A JUROR WHO CONVERSED WITH A WITNESS SHOULD 
REMAIN ON THE JURY; IN ANY CASE, THE JUROR'S 
CONVERSATION WAS NOT WITH A CRITICAL WITNESS AND 
WAS, AT MOST, INCIDENTAL, UNINTENDED AND BRIEF 
Defendant claims that "the trial court erred in failing to excuse a juror who 
communicated with the State's witness/' Aplt. Br. at 9. The claim fails because 
Defendant invited any error when, after the trial court interviewed the juror, he 
encouraged the court to allow the juror to remain on the jury. Further, Defendant's 
belated suggestion, when the jury was about to begin deliberations, that it might be 
wise to substitute the possibly tainted juror with an alternate juror, failed to 
preserve his claim of error because the suggestion was unaccompanied by any 
reason for the juror's substitution. In any event, the court did not err in allowing the 
juror to remain on the jury because the evidence shows that the juror had only an 
incidental, unintended, and brief conversation that was unlikely to have influenced 
the juror and which was with a witness who could not have been key to the State's 
case. 
10 
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A. The proceedings concerning the contact between a juror and a 
witness. 
After the jury had been selected, but before trial began, the trial court learned 
that a juror had spoken with a prosecution witness. R289:3.1 Outside the presence 
of the other jurors and in the company of counsel for the parties, the court listened 
to the juror describe the contact. R289:3-4. The juror explained that he had 
inadvertently walked over to a group in the courthouse he thought were fellow 
jurors and engaged in a brief conversation about airport carpeting with a person he 
later realized was a witness. Id. The conversation lasted about two minutes, which 
the juror terminated as soon he realized his mistake. Id. The juror apolgized for his 
mistake and assured the court that it would not happen again. Id. at 4. 
After the juror left the courtroom, the judge said that the contact sounded like 
"a pretty innoxious encounter/' R289:4. Defense counsel agreed. Id. The prosecutor 
suggested that the juror might be made an alternate and observed that the juror 
appeared to feel bad about the error. Id. Defense counsel interjected: 
Yeah, I think that I don't feel differently. Well, nothing 
inappropriate happened, that's my feeling. But you could tell he 
takes it very seriously. It is an honest mistake. He feels so badly 
about it. He said it wouldn't happen again. I think he's going to be 
a conscious [sic] and good juror. 
Id. at 5. 
1
 The transcript of all the proceedings relating to the juror-witness contact is 
attached at Addendum B. 
11 
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The court responded, "I suspect that's true/' reasserted its view that the 
encounter appeared innocuous, and stated that he believed that the juror-witness 
contact "did seem to be of such a nature he's not likely to be influenced in any way 
pro or con." Id. Without objection from either party, the court allowed the juror to 
remain on jury, admonishing him not to discuss the contact with the other jurors. 
Id. at 5-6. 
Just before the case was given to the jury, defense counsel moved, "just in 
abundance of caution," that the juror at issue be replaced with an alternate on the 
possibility that the juror might be tainted. R290: 55. The court denied this motion 
and reminded defense counsel that the court had questioned this juror early on in 
the process and that "[njobody expressed any objection to that at that point," even 
as the parties had removed other jurors for cause. Id. The court then "reasserted its] 
conclusion that [the juror] was not tainted by the process." Id. The judge further 
stated that he "believe[d] that there was an inadvertent and fleeting discussion with 
those witnesses. Again, they [sic] didn't know who they were. And there was no 
taint to it. And that the issue had been resolved before this [motion] had been 
requested." Id. at 55-56. 
After the jury announced its verdict and the jurors were polled, Defendant 
informed the trial court that both alternate jurors had stated they would not have 
found Defendant guilty. Id. at 61-62. The prosecutor confirmed that the jurors had 
12 
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so stated. Id. at 62. The alternates, however, did not participate in the jury's 
deliberations. R290:52-54. 
**-. Defendant invited any error when he affirmatively chose not to 
move to dismiss a juror who conversed with a witness. 
"[W]here a party affirmatively expresses to the trial court his assent to the 
composition of the jury, that party cannot challenge the composition of the jury on 
appeal." State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, If 18,128 P.3d 1179 (holding affirmative assent to 
composition of jury following voir dire invited error as to claim of biased jury on 
appeal) (citing State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, | 54, 70 P.3d 111 (noting that a party 
invites error if she "affirmatively represents] to the court that. . . she [has] no 
objection")). See also State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 932 (UT App 1989) ("It is well 
settled that '[i]f the complaining party participated therein, or having knowledge 
thereof, failed to make timely objection, relief by new trial will not be granted, for 
reason that a party will not be allowed either to obtain advantage from his own 
wrong or to remain silent and speculate upon the chances of a verdict/") (citation 
omitted). "Our invited error doctrine arises from the principle that "'a party cannot 
take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error/"" State v. Winfield, 2005 UT 4,f15,128 P.3d 1171 (quoting 
State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 9, 86 P.3d 742)(additional citations omitted). 
Thus, where a defendant has had an opportunity to move to dismiss a juror and 
affirmatively refuses to make the motion and, further, approves the trial court's 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
decision to allow the juror to remain on the jury, the defendant is barred from later 
raising the issue on appeal. 
Smith addressed a similar instance of invited error. After receiving a report 
from a juror that she had received a threatening telephone call, the court questioned 
the juror. Smith, 776 P.2d at 931. The juror assured the court that she was 
unaffected by the threat and felt she could continue to serve and deliberate fairly. 
Id. Responding to the court's inquiry, Defendant stated that he had no problem 
with the juror, that he would not move for a mistrial, and that the trial should 
proceed. Id. At the close of trial, and concerned that other jurors may have received 
improper contacts, the court questioned each juror individually All jurors denied 
any contact, and the juror in question stated she had received no other improper 
contact. Id. Again, following the questioning," defendant stated that he would like 
to proceed with the existing jury and that he expressly did not want a mistrial/' Id. 
After Smith was convicted, he moved for a new trial based on the improper 
juror contact. Id. This Court agreed with the lower court's denial of the motion, 
explaining that "[a] defendant cannot lead the court into error by failing to object 
and then later, when he is displeased with the verdict, profit by his actions." Id. at 
932. The Court held that Smith had two opportunities to object and "[hje 
deliberately and affirmatively refused on both occasions, and therefore defendant 
waived his right to now to complain that he was deprived of the right to trial by an 
14 
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impartial jury." Id. See also State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345 (Ut App. 1991) (holding claim 
of improper juror-witness contact waived where defendant invited error in 
"affirmatively cho[osing] not to raise objection" during trial and instead waiting 
until"after final adjudiction of the matter"). 
The Court should similarly find that defendant invited any error concerning 
the juror's inadvertent contact with a witness in this case. Here, defense counsel 
had ample opportunity to move to dismiss the juror after the juror admitted the 
inadvertent contact. Not only did defense counsel not take the opportunity to 
object, but he also "deliberately and affirmatively refused" to do so, explaining that 
he believed the contact was not problematic. R289:5; Smith, 776 P.2d at 932. Thus, 
because Defendant invited any error in allowing the juror to remain on the jury, the 
Court should decline to consider Defendant's claim of improper juror-witness 
contact. 
The Court should also decline to consider Defendant's claim because he has 
not marshaled the crucial procedural evidence supporting the trial court's decision 
to permit the juror to continue to sit. "[I]n order to challenge a trial court's factual 
findings, a party must marshal all the evidence in favor of the very findings they 
oppose on appeal." State v. Clwvez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, % 7,186 P.3d 1023 
(citation omitted). "Where the challenging party fails to adequately marshal the 
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evidence, [the appellate court] will generally presume that the record supports the 
trial court's factual findings/7 Id. (citation omitted). 
Here, Defendant includes in his brief that part of the transcript setting out the 
juror's description of his contact with a witness and the court's acceptance of the 
juror's apology. Aplt. Br. at 12-13. However, Defendant fails to include the 
conversation that immediately followed: the prosecutor's suggestion (while 
discounting the likelihood that the juror was at all biased) that an alternate might be 
substituted for the juror; Defendant's strongly expressed belief that the juror would 
act conscientiously and his implicit encouragement that the juror should continue to 
sit; and the court's agreement with both the prosecutor's and Defendant's 
assessment of the matter. R289:4-5. The proceedings clearly show that the court's 
determination that the juror would act conscientiously was substantially based on 
Defendant's favorable view of the juror. Id. Therefore, because Defendant has 
failed to marshal this critical evidence in support of the trial court's decision to 
allow the juror to sit, the Court has still greater reason to decline to consider the 
merits of Defendant's claim. 
Defendant nevertheless appears to argue —even while acknowledging that 
"defense counsel arguably invit[ed] error or waiv[ed] the matter by not 
appropriately objecting" — that the trial court erred in not substituting an alternate 
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for the juror when he suggested that the trial court do so just before the case was 
given to the jury. Aplt. Br. at 17-18. 
Defendant's suggestion hardly provided a basis for the trial court to 
reconsider the matter. Defendant provided no new facts or argument for removing 
the juror. Indeed, Defendant had foreclosed any reasonable basis for removing the 
juror when he had earlier emphatically agreed that the juror should remain on the 
jury, which the court relied on. The court reminded Defendant that it had 
interviewed the juror and investigated the issue, and "asked everybody if they were 
comfortable with the witness [sic] list" R290.55 (emphasis added). The court then 
recalled that "[n]obody expressed any objection to that at that point" and further 
"reasserted the court's] conclusion that [the juror] was not tainted by the process/' 
Id. Thus, by not making any further record concerning the juror-witness contact or 
the basis for his changed position, Defendant has failed to provide this Court with 
any ground for determining error. See State v. Miller, 24 Utah 2d 1, 464 P.2d 844, 
(Utah 1970) (holding no ground on which error could be found in ruling that certain 
hearsay testimony was inadmissible where defendant made no proffer of proof of 
excluded evidence to indicate in what manner his substantial rights were affected). 
Further, the trial court's denial of the motion to substitute the alternate for the 
juror did not elicit a motion for a mistrial from Defendant. A motion for mistrial 
would have compelled the trial court to consider any further basis for the requested 
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substitution of jurors. But Defendant did not move for a mistrial or offer any 
argument in support of such a motion. Thus, Defendant again substantially invited 
any error in allowing the juror to deliberate. See Smith, 776 P.2d at 932 (holding 
defendant invited error when, having two opportunities to move for mistrial based 
on threatening calls to juror, he "deliberately and affirmatively refused on both 
occasions"). 
In sum, because Defendant led the trial court into any error in allowing the 
juror to sit and because Defendant never provided the court with a reasoned basis 
for removing the juror, this Court should decline to consider the merits of 
Defendant's claim. In any case, the claim is meritless because the juror was not 
tainted by his brief, incidental, and insubstantial conversation with a witness. 
C The juror-witness contact was incidental, unintended, and brief, 
"'[A] rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises from any unauthorized 
contact during a trial between witnesses . . . . and jurors 'unless such contact is a 
'mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact/" Day, 815 P.2d at 1350 (quoting 
Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224,225-26 (Utah App. 1990) (citing State v. Pike , 
712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985)) (emphasis added). 
Here, the rebuttable presumption does not arise because the contact was 
merely incidental, unintended, and brief. 
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The juror did not seek out a witness in order to converse with him. Rather, 
seeking to rejoin his fellow jurors for the afternoon session of court, he inadvertently 
turned down the wrong hallway, where, instead of jurors, witnesses were gathering. 
R289:3. One of the witnesses initiated the contact by commenting that he had been 
waiting since 8:00 a.m. Id. at 3. Thus, the contact was plainly incidental and 
unintended by the juror, an assessment Defendant does not dispute. 
The encounter was also brief. Responding to the witness's comment, the juror 
said, "Well, you could be in someplace like Chicago in a [sic] airport, you know, 
with a blizzard/' They then discussed airport carpeting for "maybe two minutes — 
that's the entire conversation." Id. at 3-4. At that point they both realized that they 
should not be talking to each other and ended the conversation. Id. at 4. 
Defendant argues that the juror's estimate that the contact only lasted a 
couple of minutes could not be accurate because of the multiple topics the two men 
discussed: "medication, prolonged waiting due to court delays, the weather, and 
airport carpeting." Aplt. Br. at 12,15-16. But Defendant merely speculates. The 
juror did not discuss his medication at all with the witness, and the references to 
wait time and the weather appear to have been nothing more than a brief 
introduction to the discussion about carpeting. Id. at 3-4. Ajid that discussion could 
easily have been limited to two minutes, before the juror and witness realized their 
mistake in talking to each other and broke off their conversation. Id. at 3-4. In sum, 
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the record supports that the juror-witness contact was incidental, unintended, and 
brief. 
In spite of the foregoing facts, Defendant nevertheless argues that a 
presumption of prejudice arose from this juror-witness contact, reyling primarily on 
two cases - State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415,237 P.2d 941 (1925) and Pike. Aplt. Br. at 
9-12. Contrary to Defendant's argument, both cases are variously distinguishable 
from this case by the substantiality, length, and intrinsic prejudice of the juror-
witness contacts in those cases. 
In Anderson, the witness drove a juror to and from the courthouse daily 
throughout a trial that lasted approximately three weeks, based on a mutual 
arrangement between the two men. 237 P. at 942. The witness apparently did not 
go out of his way to create the arrangement or receive compensation, the juror 
swore that he was not influenced by the arrangement, and both men swore that they 
did not discuss the case. Id. Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court could not 
disregard that the arrangement was a "substantial favor" to the juror over an almost 
three-week period, undermining its confidence that the juror had not been 
influenced. Id. at 944. 
The contact in Pike was also more substantial than in this case. There, a police 
officer admitted to the trial court that he had been approached by a juror who asked 
him why he was limping. 712 P.2d at 279. The officer answered that he had injured 
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his toe. Id. at 279. The juror asked how he did that. Id. The officer started to 
explain that he slipped in his backyard, when the trial court interrupted the officer, 
and reserved resolution of the matter until after the verdict was in. Id. Two other 
jurors were privy to the officer's conversation with the first juror. Id. at 280. The 
trial court's inquiry into the matter never disclosed the entire contents of the 
conversation. Id. On these facts, the Utah Supreme Court held that "the 
conversation amounted to more than a brief, incidental contact and no doubt had 
the effect of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly affect the jurors 
judgment as to credibility." Id. See also State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009,1011 (Utah 
App. 1992) (holding presumption of prejudice unrebutted as to conversation 
between victim and juror, high school acquaintances, about upcoming reunion, 
which bred sense of familiarity, in spite of juror's assertion that she would not be 
impaired by discussion) (cited Aplt. Br. at 14). 
The contacts in these cases were far more substantial than in this case: 
Anderson — close contact involving witness providing favor to juror for roughly three 
weeks; Pike — conversation of indeterminate period naturally giving rise to multiple 
jurors' sympathy for witness; and Swain - conversation between high school 
acquaintances about upcoming reunion. Therefore, Defendant has provided no 
authority to support his claim that the contact in this case gave rise to a presumption 
of prejudice. Rather, the facts of this case show nothing more than a unintended 
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and incidental encounter between a witness and juror with no close bond, briefly 
discussing matters totally unrelated to the trial. Nothing suggests that the juror was 
prejudiced by this encounter or that any observers would have been suspicious of or 
questioned the integrity of the trial. Indeed, the juror, who appears to have brought 
the matter to the court on his own, apologized profusely and assured the court that 
such an encounter would not happen again, which suggests that juror clearly 
appreciated the import of his mistake and would scrupulously avoid bias in favor of 
the witness. R289:4. Accordingly, Defendant's claim should be rejected. 
But even if the contact was sufficiently long and substantial to create a 
rebuttable presumption of prejudice the presumption of prejudice is rebutted. One 
major factor, critical to reversal in Defendant's cited authority, is absent from this 
case: juror contact with a prominent witness. See e.g. Anderson, 237 P.2d at 943-44 
(witness was victim, took an active part in prosecution, assisted district attorney by 
instructing him as to certain lines of questions to be propounded to witnesses, was 
present in court daily, and appeared "at least vitally concerned in the result to be 
reached"); Pike, 712 P.2d at 278-80 (witness was "an important prosecution witness, 
who was both the arresting officer and a witness at the scene of the altercation" that 
led to aggravated assault charges); State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah App. 
1992) (juror discussed personal matters for four to five minutes with "key" witness). 
Compare Swain, 835 P.2d at 1010 (reversing without regard that witness was victim 
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in case where juror and witness were high school acquaintances who discussed an 
upcoming reunion), with State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 96 (UT App. 1987) (holding 
that State rebutted presumption of prejudice where witness was "not a key witness 
nor in such a respected position that he would likely be influentiar) rev'd on other 
grounds, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). 
Here, by contrast, there is no evidence that the juror spoke with a prominent 
witness. Indeed, no single witness was crucial to the State's case because evidence 
of all the elements of the aggravated robbery was supported by the testimony of 
multiple witnesses. The State had to prove that Defendant, as a party to the offense, 
(1) unlawfully and intentionally took personal property from another person and 
did so (2) against the person's will, by force or fear using a dangerous weapon. 
R211,225, 229. As to the first element, at least four witnesses testified that they saw 
Defendant or his accomplice, Valdez, leave Grant's bedroom with personal property 
(R293:13, 58-59; 294:12,31), and at least five other witness observed Defendant or 
Valdez in possession of the property at some point as they made their escape from 
the house. R294:81,145,203,248-49,256-57. At least four other witnesses provided 
circumstantial evidence that Defendant and Valdez took Grant's property when that 
evidence was returned after it was found in the car they had come to the party in. 
R294:151-52, 237-28, 251, 292-93. As to the second element, at least ten witnesses 
testified that either Defendant or Valdez or both of them brandished knives in a 
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violent and threatening manner as they made their way out of the house. R293:14-
15,59-60; 294:67, 79,103-07,128-29,143-45,187,203,262. Three of those witnesses 
testified that the knife blade wielded by either Defendant or Valdez was four inches 
long. R294:66,104, 202. And the undisputed testimony of six witnesses was that 
Valdez stabbed four guests with a knife as he and Defendant made their escape. 
R294:37, 70,86, 93,120,129,149. 
In sum, even if a presumption of prejudice arose from the juror's conversation 
with some witness, the presumption was rebutted because no witness was so key to 
the State's case that a juror would have voted to acquit but for a bias in favor of that 
witness.2 
Defendant also suggests that the trial court committed plain error in 
refusing to remove the juror. Aplt. Br. at 2-3. The Court should decline to address 
this claim because, apart from stating the elements of the plain error test, Defendant 
provides no legal analysis for its application. See Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 
191, f^ 7 ("[A] claim will not be reviewed by an appellate court where the "brief 
wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support.. . [the] argument/') (citation 
omitted). Moreover, Defendant's invitation of any error precludes application of the 
plain error doctrine. See Winfield, 2005 UT 4, f 14 (declining plain error review 
where error has been invited) (citations omitted). 
Defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective "in not timely 
recognizing or appropriately raising the [juror-witness contact] issue with the trial 
court." Aplt. Br. at 18. The Court should also decline to address this claim because, 
as discussed, Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence that he emphatically 
agreed that the juror should be allowed to continue to sit and that the trial court 
expressly relied on Defendant's agreement. See State v. Millard, 2010 UT App 355, f 
35, 246 P.3d 151 (declining to consider issue because defendant failed to properly 
marshal the evidence). In any case, based on the argument above, any such claim 
would be futile. See State v. Clwcon, 962 P,2d 48, 51 (Utah 1998) ("Neither 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT DENIED A MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AFTER A STATE 
WITNESS BRIEFLY MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY EXCLUDED 
INFORMATION 
Defendant claims that the trial erred in denying his mistrial motion based on a 
detective's reference that IDs belonging to other people were found in the pocket of 
a jacket that could be identified as belonging to Defendant. Aplt. Br. at 19-23. The 
claim fails because the reference was unintentionally elicited, brief, quickly passed 
over by the prosecutor, and unreferenced by Defendant. Further, evidence of 
Defendant's guilt was very strong. 
A. The proceedings concerning the detective's reference to IDs found in 
Defendant's jacket. 
After arriving at the party, Defendant asked another guest to put his jacket in 
the car in which he arrived at the party. R294:151, 215-16. The next day, Marty 
Newbury found Defendant's jacket in the car. Id. at 151, 163. He gave the 
investigating detective the jacket and a couple of Ipods and a cell phone also found 
in the car in which Defendant and Valdez fled. Id. at 152-53,227-28. The parties had 
speculative claims nor counsel's failure to make futile objections establishes 
ineffective assistance of counsel."). Noteworthy on this point is that Defendant 
filed a motion for a rule 23B remand which was unsupported by any affidavits from 
the juror or witness at issue. See Utah R. App. 23B(b) (motion "shall include or be 
accompanied by affidavits" alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on 
appeal that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney and prejudice 
resulting therefrom). Accordingly, this Court denied the motion, observing that the 
record was sufficient to make the ineffectiveness claim. 
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earlier stipulated that the IDs found in the pockets of Defendant's jacket would not 
be mentioned at trial. Id. at 174. 
On direct examination, Sandy City Police Detective Kodie Gill confirmed that 
he had received certain items in his investigation of the case: "A couple of Ipods, a 
cellphone, a leather coat, a wallet inside the leather coat with several people - -
several people type IDs/' R294:285-86, 292. Defendant did not object to the 
detective's reference to the multiple IDs, and the prosecutor immediately followed 
Detective Gill's response with questions concerning the Ipods and without any 
reference to the IDs. Id. at 292-93. 
After his cross-examination of Detective Gill, Defendant moved for a mistrial 
on the ground that mention that Defendant had IDs belonging to other people 
suggested he was guilty of identity theft which prejudice at least some of the jurors. 
Rl94:295-97. The prosecutor acknowledged that he had failed to tell the detective 
not to mention the IDs, but that he also did not expect that information to come out. 
Id. at 295-96. The trial court noted that reference to the IDs should not have been 
made, but nevertheless denied the motion, explaining that the statement"went by 
pretty quickly/' "[i]t was not emphasized by the prosecution/' and defense counsel 
did not emphasize it either. Id. at 297. The court further noted that the error was 
not deliberate and would not prejudice Defendant. Id. at 298. The court offered to 
give a curative instruction, but Defendant declined the offer, fearing that it would 
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"emphasize the negative/' and chose instead to "just let it pass by/' Id. at 297-98. 
Nevertheless, just before Defendant testified, the court struck the evidence 
concerning the jacket and instructed the jury to disregard any testimony relating to 
the jacket and to anything found in the jacket. R295:14. 
B. Any prejudice stemming from the unintentional reference to the IDs 
was cured when parties quickly moved on without further reference, 
and the trial court struck the evidence and gave a curative 
instruction, 
"[The reviewing] court 'will not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion for 
mistrial absent an abuse of discretion.'" State v. Widdison, 2000 UT App 185, f 57,4 
P.3d 100 (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,1230 (Utah 1997) overruled on oilier 
grounds, State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, f 34,116 P.3d 305). "If the trial court determines 
that the incident probably did not prejudice the jury, the court should deny the 
motion." Id. (citing Robertson at 1230-31) (emphasis added). "'Unless a review of the 
record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely 
influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, [the 
reviewing court] will not find that the court's decision was an abuse of discretion.'" 
Id. (quoting Robertston at 1231). The reviewing court gives just deference to the trial 
court's ruling "because of the advantaged position of the trial judge to determine 
the impact of events occurring in the courtroom on the total proceedings." Robertson 
at 1231 
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"A review of [Utah] case law amply reveals that a mistrial is not required 
where an improper statement is not intentionally elicited, is made in passing, and is 
relatively innocuous in light of all the testimony presented." State v. Allen 2005 UT 
11, H 40,108 P.3d 730, cert denied, 546 U.S. 832. 
In Allen, a witness impermissibly mentioned that the defendant had been 
asked to take a lie detector test. Id. at H 36. Defense counsel allowed the state to 
continue the direct examination and then asked for a bench conference in which 
defense counsel moved for a mistrial. Id. The trial court denied the motion, finding 
the statement to be "simply innocuous" and not overly prejudicial. Id. at H 37. 
Applying the foregoing standards, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's 
denial of the motion, citing as its reasons that the statement was "not intentionally 
elicited or planned," "was vague and mentioned only that [the defendant] had been 
asked to take a lie detector test—not that [he] had actually taken or failed to pass 
such a test," "was brief," "no further attention was directed to either a lie detector 
test or [the] statement," and "the district court offered to give the jury a curative 
instruction." Id. at HU 39,43. 
The supreme court reached the same reuslt in State v. Butterfield, where an 
improper statement had been made regarding a photograph taken of a defendant at 
the county jail. 2001 UT 59, H 47,27 P.3d 1133. The court ruled that the statement 
was "not intentionally elicited," "vague," and "fleeting." Id. Further the defendant 
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"pointed to no evidence in the record to suggest that the jury relied on [the 
witness's] statement," or that the jury would not have found him guilty but for the 
improper reference Id. 
In State v. Wach, the supreme court upheld a lower court's decision to deny a 
motion for mistrial where a witness introduced evidence of prior bad acts in 
violation of a stipulation because the statement was "not elicited by the prosecutor" 
and was an "isolated, off-hand remark, buried in roughly 244 pages of testimony," 
and was "not necessarily inflammatory." 2001UT 35,1146,24 P.3d 948. The supeme 
court reached the same decision in State v. Decorso, affirming the trial court's denial 
of a motion for mistrial where a witness made improper statements regarding other 
crimes of the defendant, noting that the reference "came only after a lengthy direct 
examination and lengthy cross-examination . . . moving along without undue 
interruption." 1999 UT 57, H 39,993 P.2d 837. See also State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 
881, 883 (Utah 1988) (holding district court did not commit reversible error by 
allowing witness to improperly state defendant possessed an outstanding warrant 
on another offense because where statement was unintentionally elicited, was "very 
brief" and "only made in passing," provided no details of why warrant was issued 
or to which offense it related, and district court admonished jury to disregard 
statement); State v. Case, 547 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1976) (holding district court 
properly denied defendant's motion for a mistrial after witness stated defendant 
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had been incarcerated in prison where statement was inadvertent, not intentionally 
elicited, and neither counsel nor court made further reference to it). 
The facts support the same outcome in this case. The prosecutor admitted 
that he had mistakenly failed to tell the detective not to mention the IDs, but the 
reference was brief, and the parties moved on without further reference to the IDs. 
In denying Defendant's mistrial motion, the court relied on those facts. R294:297. 
The court further noted that the error was not deliberate and would not prejudice 
Defendant. Id. at 298. 
Also, the detective's statement was vague, a factor mentioned in the foregoing 
authority. Detective Gill did not provide any detail about the IDs, the number of 
IDs, their nature, to whom they belonged, or that they directly constituted evidence 
of criminal wrongdoing. R294:292. In fact, Defendant was not charged with any 
offense related to identity theft in connection with this incident. And even if some 
jurors were able to infer from two witnesses' testimony that the jacket likely 
belonged to Defendant, the reference to the IDs was no more prejudicial than 
references to a defendant's jail time (Butterfield; Case), prior bad acts (Wach), 
outstanding warrants (Griffiths), or prior crimes (Decorso). 
Further, the trial court struck the evidence and gave a curative instruction, 
directing the jury to disregard any testimony relating to the jacket and to anything 
found in the jacket. R295:14. While Defendant disparages the use of curative 
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instructions, see Aplt. Br. at 22-23, Utah's appellate courts have repeatedly affirmed 
their utility. See e.g. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262,272 (Utah 1998) (recognizing that 
few trials could be successfully concluded if trial judges were prohibited from 
giving "routine" curative instructions, and asserting that judicial system relies on 
jurys' intergrity in following the law as instructed); State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 
401 (Utah 1994) (holding discovery violation sufficiently cured when impermissible 
testimony was stricken and the jury was instructed to ignore it); State v. Alfred, 2002 
UT App 291, Tf 20, 55 P.3d 1158 (upholding denial of mistrial motion stemming 
from improper testimony of defendant's having previously received Miranda 
warnings where court provided curative instruction). In sum, given the brevity, 
vagueness, de-emphasis, and unitendedness of the detective's comment, the court's 
curative instruction could only have assisted in diminishing any prejudice 
stemming from it 
Finally, evidence of guilt was very compelling. See State v. Duran, 2011 UT 
App 254, Tf^ f. 35-39, P.3d (upholding denial of mistrial motion where 
testimony suggesting defendant's prior criminality was brief, unintended, and 
evidence of guilt was strong). As discussed above, multiple witnesses testified to 
each and every element required to prove aggravated robbery. Aple. Br. at LC 
Base on all circumstances surrounding the detective's statement there is no 
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reasonable basis for this Court to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying the motion for mistrial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ ? day of August, 2011. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-302 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*HChapter 6. Offenses Against Property 
"•Part 3. Robbery 
•*•§ 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1- 601: 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing a 
robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-302; Laws 1975, c. 51, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 7; Laws 1994, c. 
271, 5 1: Laws 2003, c. 62, S 1, eff. May 5, 2003. 
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OCTOBER 22, 2008; 2:00 p.m. 
PROCEEDINGS 
(After voir dire and noon recess, the following 
proceedings in chambers were had with the Court, counsel, and 
one of the jury members.) 
THE COURT: It has come to our attention you were 
talking to some witnesses from the prosecution! s side there and 
itf s something we iust canf t do. So the Question I have for 
you, I have to look into it — 
JUROR: Yes. Yes. 
THE COURT: How did you come to talk to them? 
JUROR: Well, you know. I have got a lot of voads 
with ire, obviously, we were discussing it this morning. Monday 
when I came through security, no problem. This morning, no 
problem. This afternoon they wanted to look at everything, 
which is great, it is just makes it safer for me and I don't 
care. But it did make me a bit late coming upstairs. 
I saw these people and I thought, well, I saw those 
people this morning. I thought they were fellow jurors, they 
weren't. I turned on the wrong hallway. I recall the only 
thing we discussed down there — I got this — we're waiting 
there and had been waiting. One of the first guys said, "I 
have been here since 8:00 this iteming." And I said, "Well, 
you could be in someplace like Chicago in a airport, you know, 
with the blizzard." So i t ' s — we were discussing airport 
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carpeting. We realized the mistake and that's all we 
discussed. 
Maybe two minutes, that's the entire conversation 
that we had. 
THE COURT: Anything else happen? 
JUROR: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
JUROR: Yes. I apologize for screwing this up. 
THE COURT: Your apology is accepted. 
JUROR: It ain't going to happen again, I'll 
guarantee you that. 
THE COURT: Before you leave, anybody want to ask any 
questions? 
MR. JANZEN: No. No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Thank you, [Juror]. 
Thank you. 
(Whereupon the juror exited chambers.) 
THE COURT: Get all the jurors in one room and 
[Juror]. Where are they now? 
THE BAILIFF: They are in the jury room. 
THE COURT: Just put him — well, hold for a second. 
Just want to close the door. Okay. It sounds like it is a 
pretty innoxious encounter at that point. 
MR. S3M£S: Yes. 
MR. PLAYER: I agree. If you want to make him an 
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-1 alternate because of the encounter and put one of the others in 
2 as an alternate I wouldn't think that would be inappropriate. 
3 But I don't think it's a — I think he feels bad for both sides 
4 that he made a mistake. 
A5 MR. SBMS: Yeah, I think that I don't feel 
6 differently. Well, nothing inappropriate happened, that's my 
7 feeling. But you could tell he takes it very seriously. It is 
8 an honest mistake. He feels so badly about it. He said it 
9 wouldn't happen again. I think he's going to be conscious and 
10 a good juror. 
11 THE COURT: I suspect that's true. I don't know. My 
12 inclination is not to change anything in the lineup at this 
13 point but simply, you know, find it was an innoxious encounter. 
14 It did seem to be of such a nature he's not likely to be 
15 influenced in any way pro or con. 
16 MR. JENZEN: The only thing, Your Honor, I would 
17 mention is, we should probably bring him back and have him make 
18 sure he doesn't discuss this whole situation with other jurors. 
19 THE COURT: Yes. That's a very good idea. Why don't 
20 you ask him to come back in. 
2 1 I (TtlS niirr^r . r e e n t e r e d chsinhSII'S. ) 
22 THE COURT: [Juror], the only thing I want to tell 
23 you as you're going back to the jury, don't discuss this 
24 incident with any of the jurors in any way. 
25 JUROR: No problem. 
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THE COURT: And nothing else will cane of it and 
thank you for your candor. 
JUROR: I apologize for that. 
THE COURT: It's accepted. 
Thank you very much, okay. 
(Juror excused.) 
THE COURT: Are we ready to go then? 
(Whereupon the following proceedings were had in the courtrocsi 
in front of the jury.) 
THE COURT: The jury is here in the jury box and 
Defendant and counsel are here. The prosecution is here 
representing as well. 
Jury ready to go forward? Okay. 
You have been ready for a little while. I apologize 
to you for the wait. We occasionally do have delays. I will 
assure you that we are not sitting around while that's 
happening, we're working. You may have already concluded but 
I'nt sure by the tiire you will, by the tiire we/re done with 
this, this is not an extremely efficient process. And I try to 
keep these kinds of delays to a minimum. But I appreciate your 
T3atience in the zt^ antiir^ . 
We'll start with the jury instructions and pass out 
copies of those jury instructions. I'm starting on page Roman 
Numeral one, which is about the fourth page in. All right. 
(Thereupon the jury was charged with the jury instructions.) 
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1 giving us the time. I hope that it was an experience that you 
2 feel was in same way at least worthwhile. There was some 
a3 compensation for you being here. 
4 And I hope things go well with you. I won't see you 
5 again I hope. I hope we won't need to call you. 
6 Have any questions at this point? 
J Make sure the clerk does have your phone numbers and 
8 I contact information. And renumber, it's "^ ust as if Trou were 
9 going home last night. You are under the sane restraints as 
10 previously, okay. 
11 We did order you lunch. Kept you past the noon hour 
^ j 
12 and lunch is being ordered. So talk to the clerk about getting 
13 that. If you want to wait just a few minutes we'll pick it up 
14 and bring it to you. You don't have to stay for lunch if you 
15 don't want. 
•2* I 
16 You are excused at this point. And let's have you 
17 come over and give your contact information. Let's get out of 
IS the room before we go ahead and release everybody else. 
19 Maybe the bailiff can get the contact information out 
20 back. Why don't you go out back with the bailiff and we'll do 
21 that. 
22 (vihareupazi the alternate jurors were excused.) 
23 THE COURT 
24 MR. SB£4S 
25 THE COURT 
Counsel
 r is there anything else? 
Yes. 
Have a seat. 
54 
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1 MR. SIMMS: I think the Court indicated, thought 
2 that — 
3 THE COURT: Let's put that on the record. 
4 MR. SIMMS: The one juror who had a conversation with 
5 witnesses, I think the Court felt the issue was resolved. And 
3 1 
6 we'd noved at the end, just in abundance of caution, say let's, 
7 you know, let's — that person nay be tainted, could be 
S ! tainted, whv don't we, because we have an untainted alternate 
9 move to that alternate? And I think the Court said, no, that 
10 issue has been decided. We're going to have him remain on the 
11 jury. 
12 THE COURT: I did. And there was a request made to 
13 remove [Juror] and substitute with an alternate based on issues 
l A we've discussed before with him and separately that he had been 
15 seen in conversation with witnesses for the prosecution early 
16 in the process. We get a lot that on — we did interview him 
17 and before we cane in here we had a bench conference — or a 
18 conference in chambers that was recorded, it may have been, in 
19 which I asked everybody if they were comfortable with the 
20 witness list, which excluded [Juror] and [Juror] . 
21 [Juror] for cause that we had already talked. 
22 [Juror] is the final remaining alternate. Nobody expressed any 
23 objection to that at that point. And I reassert my conclusion 
24 that he was not tainted by the process. That I believe that 
25 there was an inadvertent and fleeting discussion with those 
55 
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1 witnesses. Again, they didn't know who they were. And there 
2 was no taint to it. And that the issue had been resolved 
3 before this had been requested. You are entitled to make your 
4 request and we' re sinply making the record as you have very 
5 professionally done. 
A I 
6 Before we get a verdict back I want to tell you how 
7 much I've appreciated professionalism shown here and 
8 everybody's conduct in this. It's been a very well done trial, 
9 Mr. Tafuna, you've reported yourself well in this 
10 process. And also I know that you've had family and friends 
11 here in support. You know, when we get a verdict out, assuming 
12 we get a verdict in this, and I think we probably will of one 
13 sort or another. I don't know what it's going to be. You have 
14 been very good through this process. I appreciate the dignity 
15 that you brought to these proceedings. 
16 No matter what the verdict is please don't make any 
17 demonstration or any noise about it while the jury is still in 
18 here. You have been -- you've had great respect for these 
19 proceedings and I appreciate that. 
20 Counsel, you know the drill here. We need cellphone 
21 | or contact information. 
22 And anything else that we need to address? 
23 MR. PLAYER: No, not from the State. 
24 MR. SIMMS: No. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you. The Court is in recess 
56 
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